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Thrfol~wingedited euerpg isporn t h amicus
~
curiae briefjled in
- .:
''Crawford
v. Washington, heard befire the U S Supreme Court on
. , . - .November 10,2003.(An elaboratedform ofthe brief appears at 2004
tamationid J o w d of Evidence and Proof 1-30.) Law School
Fisher, '97,(ne stories on page 33 and page 76) argued
6ehaIJlfofCrdYtrford.f i e t v i a m s written by Ralph WAigler Profrsr
Law Richard-fi~ f f d m a n ~ D o vA.i dMoran, '9I.Assistant Projkor
,hat W ~ n Stare
e Law School, wm ofcornel. Anmng the signatories are
%~rc$ssrror $Law ShermanJLClark and Assoics'ate Dean& Clinical Afdirs
McCorma& both ofthe Law Schoolfaculty. At deadline time, the
noajgt onnneuncr4 tcr d d s i o n in the case.
,+& .(;, .

rd D. ~rie&ai, -

ike Lee v. Illinois, 476 US.540 (1986), a d BLly v. Virginia,
5 27 U.S. 116 (1999), t&s case is arn example oftwhatmighi
be called station-hauaetetimony. Sylvia Qradord, the
petitioner's wife, made a tape-recorded stzitanent to investigating
officers at the police station on the night of the alleged lime.
Sylvia was &willing to tea* at bid against her husband, and
was deemed by all parties to he un5tdable as a witmess. Over
petitioner's objection, Sylvia's statement was introduced, and
petitioner was convicted. Amid file &is brief to address &second
Question Resented in the petition fpr.cerri~mi:
"Whether this COW should reevaluate 8[hCan$rontation
]
Clause framework establidwdin Ohio v. hberts, 448 U.S.5.6
(1980), and hold that the Clause uequivocally probibits the
admission of out-of-court &tternenl%insofar aa they are contained
in 'testimonial' materials, such- taperwarded custodial matements."
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Like the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial, the rieht

Summary of argument
By granting ccrtiorori in this case, the Court has created an
opportunity to replace an unsatisfactory conception of the
Confrontation Clausc with one that is historically well grouncled,
textually faithful, intuitively appealing, and straightfor\varrl in
application. This conception confines the Clause to its proper
sphere and at the same time makes clear thc place of the confrontation right as one of the funrlamcntal cornerstones of our system
of criminal justice. Adopting this conception will also make the

la\v Sar easier than current doctrine for the lower courts to follow,
hccause the Confrontation Clausc decisions of this Court will be
explained by rcfcrcncc to a rohust, easily understood principle
11-it11deep roots in the Anglo-American tradition and, indeed,
thi-oughout Western jurisprudence. This principle is that the
testimony of a witness may not be used against an accused unless
it was given under the conclitions prescribed for testimony, among
which are that it be under oath or affirmation, that it be given in
the presence of the accused, and that it be subject to cross-esamination.
Implementation of the principle rcquires recognition that
a statement may be testimonial in nature even though it was
not made under the conditions prescribed for testimony. Thus,
a statement made knowingly to authorities accusing another
person of a crime is clearly a testimonial statement - even
though it was made without oath o r cross-examination and in

to confront witnesses is subject to waiver, and it is also subject
to forfeiture, for the accused has no grounrl to complain if his
own wrongdoing causes his inability t o confront the witnecs. Like
those other rights, the right to conh-ont adverse \vitnecses can and
should be applied unequivocally. That is, if the statement is a testimonial one and the right has not been waived o r forfeited, then
the right ~ h o u l dapply without cxceptions. This simple approach
is possible because the scope of the right, properly conceived.
is quite narrow. It docs not reach out-of-court statements in
general, but only those that are testimonial in nature.
Under the currently prevailing doctrine, by contrast, the
scope of the Clause is extremely broad: Any hearsay statement
made by an out-of-court declarant is presumptively excluded
by the Clause. A flat exclusionary rule of such breadth would be
impractical, and so the doctrine exempts from the presumptive
rule many statements that are deemed to be reliable -purportedlv so reliable that cross-examination would be of little value.
Statements that fit within "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions are
deemed reliable lvithout more. Just which of the many hearsay
exceptions - a term used in this brief to cover both exceptions proper to the rule against hearsay and exclusions fi-om the
definition of hearsay - are considered to be "firmly rooted" is a
question that this Court has only partially resolved. O n an ad hoc
basis, the Court has declared hearsay exceptions, o r part of them,

Even if a statement is deemed reliable,
the Confrontation Clause may bar its
use if the declarant is available to be
a witness.

the presence of no one hut the authorities. If a report by the
authorities of a statcment made in this way may be considered
by the trier of fact, then a system has been created that tolerates

either within that category or not, but the Court has never offered
a clear set of criteria for determining what makes an exception
"firmly rooted." If a statement does not fit within a "firmly

the giving of testimony behind closed doors. The very point of
the Confrontation Clause was to prevent the creation of such a

rooted" exception, it may yet satisfy the reliability requirement,

system. That a statement was made absent the conditions required
by the system for testimony does not render the statement non-

trustn~orthiness."Thisstandard is hea\-ily fact-bound and demands
case-by-case review. Even if a statement is deemed reliable, the

testimonial in nature - rather, if the statement was testimonial
in nature, the absence of those conditions renders the testimony

to be a witness. As with reliability, the criteria for the unavail-

intolerable. Put another way, the Confrontation Clause gives
the accused more than a right to confront "all those ~ l l appear
o
and give evidence at trial." (Cal!fornia

I:

Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175

if the statement is deemed to have "individualized guarantees of

Confrontation Clause may bar its use if the declarant is available
ability requirement are unclear. If the statement falls \vitl~inthe
cxception for former testimonv, the declarant must be unavailable
or the Clausc will preclude its use; if the statement falls within

[I9701 Harlan, J . , concurring). Its primary impact is to ensure

the cxccptions for spontaneous declarations, statements made

that prosecution witnesses do give their cvidence at trial, or if
at which the accused is able to
necessary at a pretrial

for purposes of medical treatment, and conspil-ator declarations,
unavailability is not required; in other contexts it is not yet kno~\-n

confront them.

whether the unavailability requirement applies.
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This framework is unpredictable and overcomplicated, and

accused unless the accused has or has had an adequate oppor-

so it too frequently yields very bad results in the lower courts.

tunity t o confront the witness. A subsidiary principle is that if

r kcapable of producing good results; indeed,
The f r a m e ~ ~ o is

the accused has had an adequate opportunity t o confront the

adopting the approach proposed in h s brief would not require

witness at an earlier time but, without fault of the prosecution,

the C o u r t t o overrule any of its Confrontation Clause decisions.

the ~vitnessis unavailable to testify at trial, tllen the witncss' prior

But tlle esisting framework reaches good results consistently only

statement may be used. . . .

if it is manipulated. In this respect, it resembles the Ptolemeian
astronomical system.That system, too, was capable of yielding
good results, but only if it was manipulated and made ever more
complex t o ensure that its results matched empirical observations. Ultimately, the system failed to explain coherently the
phenomenon it was trying t o describe. Because the system's
predictive power was thus limited, it became necessary t o adopt
a n e w organizing principle. In the confrontation context, too, a
n e w organizing ~ r i n c i p l eis necessary: Rather than treating the
Confrontation Clause as a generalized attempt t o exclude unreliable hearsay etidence, the Court should r e c o p z e that the Clause
is a guarantee that testimony offered against an accused must be
given in the manner prescribed for centuries, in the presence of
the accused and subject t o cross-exan~ination.

Argument
I.The text of the Confrontation Clause supports a testimonial approach to the Clause, and not the Roberts framework.
We begin with the text of the Confrontation Clause. It provides
in simple terms: In all criminal prosecutions, "the accused shall
enjoy tlie right . . . t o be confronted with the xvitnesses against
him ."
Now compare h o ~ vthis language squares respectively with the
prevailing framework established by Roberts and with the testimonial approach proposed here. The prevailing framework was laid
out by Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. As subsequently modified, it has
these principal elements:
1 . "[Wlhen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-exaniination at trial," use of the hearsay declaration is presumptively
barred by the Confrontation Clause.
2 . Even though it is hearsay, an out-of-court statement may be
admitted against an accused (subject to the possible applicability
of an unavailability requirement) if it is sufficiently reliable. Under
this doctrine, statements are deemed reliable if the evidence
either "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or "contains
'particularlized guarantees of trustworthiness' such that adversarial testing \vould be expected t o add little, If anything, t o the
statements' reliability." (Lilb, 527 U.S. at 124-25, quoting in part
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.)
In short, the Roberts framework depends on a set of concepts
-hearsay, reliability, and exceptions -none
of which is
supported by the text of the Confrontation Clause.
hi contrast, that text squares very well with the testimonial
approach, the core of which may be expressed as follows: Use
against an accused of the statement of a witness -that is, a
statement that is testimonial in nature - violates a right of the
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II.The history underlying thc Confrontation Clause
supports a testimonial approach to the Clause, and not the
Roberts frame~vork.
If an adjudicative system is rational, then it must rely in large
part o n the testimony of witnesses and prescribe the conditions under which they may testify. For many systems, one such
condition is that testimony must be given under oath. Another
common condition, characteristic of the common law system but
not limited to it, is that testimony of a prosecution witness must
be given in the presence of the accused, subject t o questions by
him or on his behalf.
Once the irrational methods of medieval adjudication, such as
trial by ordeal and by battle, withered away, Western legal systems
developed different approaches t o testimony. Continental systems
tended to take testimony o n written questions behind closed
doors and out of the presence of the parties for fear that the
witnesses would be coached or intimidated. In contrast, beginning
in the 15th century and continuing for centuries afterwards,
numerous English judges and commentators -John Fortescue,
Thomas Smith, Matthew Hale, andWilliam Blackstone among
them -praised the open and confrontational style of the English
criminal trial.
To be sure, the n o r m of confrontation was not always
respected. First, a set of courts in England followed continental
procedures rather than those of the common
Precisely for
that reason, they were politically controversial, and most of them
(notably the Court of Star Chamber), being viewed as arms of an
unlimited royal power, did not survive the upheavals of the 17th
century. . . . Perhaps most significantly, in politically charged cases
the Crown, trying to control its adversaries though the criminal
law, sometimes used testimony taken out of the presence of the
accused. Thus, the battle for confrontation was most clearly
fought in the treason cases ofTudor and Stuart England. Even
early in the 16th century, treason defendants demanded t l ~ a t
witnesses be brought before them; often they used the term
"face to face." Sometimes these demands were heeded, but what
is most notable is that they found recurrent legislative supports,
acts of Parliament repeatedly requiring that accusing witnesses be
brought "face to face" with thc accused. By the middle of the 17th
centur): the battle was won, and courts routinely required that
treason witnesses testify before the accused and be subjected t o
questioning by h m .
The confrontation right naturally found its way to America.
There, the right to counsel developed far more quickly than in
England, and with it an adversarial spirit that made confrontation especially crucial. The right became a particular focus of

.4mcrican concerns in the 1760s when the Stamp Acts ant1 othcr

Confrontation guarantees openness of proccdure, which among

Parliamentary regulations of thc colonics pro\ridcd for thc cxami-

other henefits ensures that the witness' testimony is not the

nation of \vitncsscs upon interrogatories in certain circumstances.

product of torture or of milrlcr forms of coercion or intimidation.

N n t sur~x-isingly,the earl\. statc constitutions guaranteed thc

Confrontation provides a chance for the defendant, personally

confrontation right. Somc uscd thc timc-honorcd "facc to facc"

or through counsel, to dispute and explore the kveaknecseq in
the \vitness' testimony.

I;,rmula; others, follo~vingHalc and Rlackstonc, adopted languagc
strikingly similar to that later uscd in thc Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clausc.
This account has not mentioned rcliahility. Though one of thc

Confrontation

discourages falsehoocl as \ire11 as assists in its

detection. Thc prospect of testifying undcr oath, subject
to cross-examination, and in the presence of the accused,

atlvantagcs pcrcci\lctl for confrontation was its contribution to

makes false accusation much more difficult than it would be

t r u t h tlctcrmination, thc confrontation right was not considered
contingcnt. inapplicalde upon a judicial dctcrmination that the

other\vise.

prticular tcstimony was unrcliablc.
Similarly, the la\v against hearsay has not playcd a role in this
account. Hearsay law, likc evidence law more generally, was
not lvcll dc\~clopeclat thc time thc Clause was adoptcd, much

If, as is usually the case, the confrontation occurs at trial o r in a
videotaped proceeding, the trier of fact has an opportuni? t o
assess the demeanor of the witness.
Confrontation eliminates the need for intermediaries, and
along with it any doubt about what the witness' testimony is.

The confrontation right
naturally found its way to
America. There, the right to
counsel developed far more
quickly than in England, and
with it an adversarial spirit
that made confrontation
especially crucial.

lcss during the previous ccnturics. In exprcssing a fundamental
proccclural principle govcrning how tcstimonv must be given,
thc Clause was not meant to constitutionalizc the law of hcarsav.
The Roberts framcwork is a lattcr-day construct, with 110historical
roots.
111. Thc testimonial approach reflects values warranting
constitutional protection, and the Roberts framework does not.

Whcn the statement is testimonial, the question is not
simply an evidcntiary one, \vhethcr the particular statemcnt
should be included in the body of information prescnted to the
tricr of fact. Rathcr, therc is no\v a basic proccdural issue, of
how tcstimony against an accuscd shall be given. And therc is no
doubt that tllc constitutional dcmand is that such testimony be
qiven facc to face wit11 the accuscd, subject to cross-examination.
Insisting on such confrontation as the required method for givlng
testimonv servcs several important instrumental purposes:

IV. As compared to the Roberts framework, the testimonial
approach gives better guidance to the lower courts, is more
practical to implement, and is less susceptible to manipulation.

The testimonial approach can be articulated in terms of four
basic questions.
1 . First, was the statement testimonial in naturc?The statement
falls within the scope of the Confrontation Clause if and onlv if the
answer is affirmative. It is clear that Sylvia Crawford's statement
to the police M-as testimonial, under an!. rcasonahle approach.The
statemcnt was electronically recorded by the police in a police
station after the incident at issue. Thc recolading was made with
considerable ceremonv, clearly for use in later proceedings, and
Ms. Cra~rrfordspoke in rcsponse to questioning much as if in a
deposition

-hut

without oath or cross-csamination. If statc-

ments madc in such circumstances arc allo\ved as proof at trial,
then under anv plausible view the declarant is testifying \vhen she

LQN Spring 2004

1

95

made such a statement, for there is no doubt that a reasonable
person in her position would anticipate that her statements would
likely be used as evidence in a future criminal proceeding.
Just as in this case, the question of whether a given statement
should be considered testimonial can usually be rather easily
resolved, as indicated by the following "rules of thumb":
A statement made by a person claiming to be the victim of a
crime and describing the crime is usually testimonial, whether
made directly to the authorities or not.
If, in the case of a crime committed over a short period of time,
a statement is made before the crime is committed, it almost
certainly is not testimonial.
A statement made bv one participant in a criminal enterprise to
another, intended to further the enterprise, is not testimonial.
And neither is a statement made in the course of going about
one's ordinary business, made before the criminal act has
occurred or with no recoLgnitionthat it relates to criminal
activity.
Thus, testimonial statements include not only statements
made as testimony at the trial itself, but also testimony given at a
prior trial or other judicial proceeding, and statements, like the
one in this case, knowingly made to investigating authorities or
with the understanding that they will reach and be used by those
authorities. Inevitably, some cases remain near the borderline, but
that in itself is not troubling.

2. Assuming the statement is testimonial, the second basic
question is: Will the accused have had an adequate opportunity
to confront the witness? In some settings, this question poses
interesting issues, such as whether the witness may testify via an
electronic connection to the courtroom, whether an opportunity
to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing suffices for purposes
of the Confiontatiorl Clause, or whether the witness' memory
loss at the time of cross-examination unduly impairs the accused's
confiontation opportunity. Usually, though, the answer to this
question is clear, as it is here; Michael Crawford did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine Sylvia.
If the accused \vill not have had an adequate opportunity
to confront the witness, then introduction of the testimonial
statement to prove the truth of what it asserts violates the
accused's confrontation right unless the answer to the third
question is in the affirmative:
3. Did the accused waive the right to confrontation by failing to
object, or forfeit it by misconduct?The accused might forfeit the
right, for example, by intimidating the witness, kidnapping her,
o r murdering her. An accused cannot complain about this inability
to confront the witness if it is his ovm wrongful conduct that
created that inability. This principle -rather than the fiction that
cross-examination would be practically useless anyway because
a declarant would not wish to die with a lie on her lips -best
the admissibility of certain statements by dying witnesses.
If the testimonial statement was made at an earlier time, and
the accused then had an adequate opportunity to conhont the
witness, a fourth question arises:
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4. Has the witness been shown to be unavailable to testify at
trial? If the answer is negative, thcn the statcmcnt may not bc
used, because live testimony is possible and prcfcrrctl. If thc
answer is affirmative, ho\vever, the Confrontation Clausc poses
no obstacle to admissibility of thc statcmcnt, unless thc prosccution's wrongdoing causes the unavailability. Taking thc testimony
at trial would be ideal, but the ideal is not possible; an opportunity for confrontation is what is essential, and the accused has
had it.

Conclusion
Current doctrine relies on hearsav law to do the work that
should be performed by the Confrontation Clause, and this
has been detrimental to both. It has made hearsay la\&.overly
rigid, and it has obscured the meaning of the Clause. Once it is
recoLgnizedthat the scope of the Clause is narrower than that of
hearsay law, and that it applies only to those statements that are
testimonial in nature, the essence of that right becomes apparent:
It protects one of the central procedural aspects of our system
of criminal justice, the presentation of testimony in the presence
of the accused and subject to cross-examination. That right may
be waived or forfeited, but it is not subject to exceptions nor
can it be trumped by a judicial determination that the particular
statement at issue is reliable.
R i c h a r d D. Friedman,
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